CVE-2022-46169
Cacti Command Injection
- Published5 Dec 2022
- Added to CISA KEV16 Feb 2023
- Remediation due9 Mar 2023
Description
Cacti is an open source platform which provides a robust and extensible operational monitoring and fault management framework for users. In affected versions a command injection vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a server running Cacti, if a specific data source was selected for any monitored device. The vulnerability resides in the `remote_agent.php` file. This file can be accessed without authentication. This function retrieves the IP address of the client via `get_client_addr` and resolves this IP address to the corresponding hostname via `gethostbyaddr`. After this, it is verified that an entry within the `poller` table exists, where the hostname corresponds to the resolved hostname. If such an entry was found, the function returns `true` and the client is authorized. This authorization can be bypassed due to the implementation of the `get_client_addr` function. The function is defined in the file `lib/functions.php` and checks serval `$_SERVER` variables to determine the IP address of the client. The variables beginning with `HTTP_` can be arbitrarily set by an attacker. Since there is a default entry in the `poller` table with the hostname of the server running Cacti, an attacker can bypass the authentication e.g. by providing the header `Forwarded-For: <TARGETIP>`. This way the function `get_client_addr` returns the IP address of the server running Cacti. The following call to `gethostbyaddr` will resolve this IP address to the hostname of the server, which will pass the `poller` hostname check because of the default entry. After the authorization of the `remote_agent.php` file is bypassed, an attacker can trigger different actions. One of these actions is called `polldata`. The called function `poll_for_data` retrieves a few request parameters and loads the corresponding `poller_item` entries from the database. If the `action` of a `poller_item` equals `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`, the function `proc_open` is used to execute a PHP script. The attacker-controlled parameter `$poller_id` is retrieved via the function `get_nfilter_request_var`, which allows arbitrary strings. This variable is later inserted into the string passed to `proc_open`, which leads to a command injection vulnerability. By e.g. providing the `poller_id=;id` the `id` command is executed. In order to reach the vulnerable call, the attacker must provide a `host_id` and `local_data_id`, where the `action` of the corresponding `poller_item` is set to `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`. Both of these ids (`host_id` and `local_data_id`) can easily be bruteforced. The only requirement is that a `poller_item` with an `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP` action exists. This is very likely on a productive instance because this action is added by some predefined templates like `Device - Uptime` or `Device - Polling Time`. This command injection vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary commands if a `poller_item` with the `action` type `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP` (`2`) is configured. The authorization bypass should be prevented by not allowing an attacker to make `get_client_addr` (file `lib/functions.php`) return an arbitrary IP address. This could be done by not honoring the `HTTP_...` `$_SERVER` variables. If these should be kept for compatibility reasons it should at least be prevented to fake the IP address of the server running Cacti. This vulnerability has been addressed in both the 1.2.x and 1.3.x release branches with `1.2.23` being the first release containing the patch.
CVSS 3.1 breakdown
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HAffected products
Remediation
- https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/commit/7f0e16312dd5ce20f93744ef8b9c3b0f1ece2216
- https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/commit/a8d59e8fa5f0054aa9c6981b1cbe30ef0e2a0ec9
- https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/commit/b43f13ae7f1e6bfe4e8e56a80a7cd867cf2db52b
- https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/security/advisories/GHSA-6p93-p743-35gf
References
- https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/commit/7f0e16312dd5ce20f93744ef8b9c3b0f1ece2216
- https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/commit/a8d59e8fa5f0054aa9c6981b1cbe30ef0e2a0ec9
- https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/commit/b43f13ae7f1e6bfe4e8e56a80a7cd867cf2db52b
- https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/security/advisories/GHSA-6p93-p743-35gf
- https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2022-46169
Related CVEs
Recent high-severity vulnerabilities sharing a weakness type.
Frequently asked
Is CVE-2022-46169 being actively exploited?
Yes. CVE-2022-46169 is listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, added 16 Feb 2023.
How severe is CVE-2022-46169?
CVE-2022-46169 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.8, rated critical. EPSS estimates a 99.8% probability of exploitation.
Which products are affected by CVE-2022-46169?
Affected products include Cacti.
How do I fix CVE-2022-46169?
Upgrade affected software to a fixed version, for example Cacti 1.2.23 or later, then confirm no affected versions remain in your inventory.
How Secuno handles this
Secuno correlates vulnerabilities like CVE-2022-46169 against the real software inventory on every managed device, as each hourly inventory arrives. Rather than a static severity, each match is scored in context: exploit availability, EPSS, the asset's exposure, and business criticality decide where it lands in the queue. Because it is on the CISA KEV list, a risk for it never ranks below high, and the update that fixes it moves to the Emergency patch lane. If an affected version is present anywhere across your portfolio, it surfaces automatically with a prioritised remediation path.
Data from the NVD, CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS. CVSS 3.1 base score shown where available.