CVE-2026-31607: Linux Kernel buffer overflow (CVSS 9.8)

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() When a USB/IP client receives a RET_SUBMIT response, usbip_pack_ret_submit() unconditionally overwrites urb->number_of_packets from the network PDU. This value is subsequently used as the loop bound in usbip_recv_iso() and usbip_pad_iso() to iterate over urb->iso_frame_desc[], a flexible array whose size was fixed at URB allocation time based on the *original* number_of_packets from the CMD_SUBMIT. A malicious USB/IP server can set number_of_packets in the response to a value larger than what was originally submitted, causing a heap out-of-bounds write when usbip_recv_iso() writes to urb->iso_frame_desc[i] beyond the allocated region. KASAN confirmed this with kernel 7.0.0-rc5: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbip_recv_iso+0x46a/0x640 Write of size 4 at addr ffff888106351d40 by task vhci_rx/69 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 320-byte region [ffff888106351c00, ffff888106351d40) The server side (stub_rx.c) and gadget side (vudc_rx.c) already validate number_of_packets in the CMD_SUBMIT path since commits c6688ef9f297 ("usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input") and b78d830f0049 ("usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input"). The server side validates against USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS because no URB exists yet at that point. On the client side we have the original URB, so we can use the tighter bound: the response must not exceed the original number_of_packets. This mirrors the existing validation of actual_length against transfer_buffer_length in usbip_recv_xbuff(), which checks the response value against the original allocation size. Kelvin Mbogo's series ("usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in usbip_recv_iso()", v2) hardens the receive-side functions themselves; this patch complements that work by catching the bad value at its source -- in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite -- and using the tighter per-URB allocation bound rather than the global USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS limit. Fix this by checking rpdu->number_of_packets against urb->number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite. On violation, clamp to zero so that usbip_recv_iso() and usbip_pad_iso() safely return early.

CVSS 3.1 breakdown

Attack vectorNetwork

Attack complexityLow

Privileges requiredNone

User interactionNone

ScopeUnchanged

ConfidentialityHigh

IntegrityHigh

AvailabilityHigh

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected products

Linux Kernel≥ 2.6.39 < 6.6.136 · ≥ 6.13 < 6.18.24 · ≥ 6.19 < 6.19.14 · ≥ 6.7 < 6.12.83

Remediation

Fixed in

Linux Kernel≥ 6.6.136

Patch & vendor advisories

References

and 8 more references

Related CVEs

Recent high-severity vulnerabilities sharing a weakness type.

Frequently asked

Is CVE-2026-31607 being actively exploited?

CVE-2026-31607 is not in the CISA KEV catalog. Its EPSS exploit probability is 0.44%.

How severe is CVE-2026-31607?

CVE-2026-31607 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.8, rated critical. EPSS estimates a 0.44% probability of exploitation.

Which products are affected by CVE-2026-31607?

Affected products include Linux Kernel.

How do I fix CVE-2026-31607?

Upgrade affected software to a fixed version, for example Linux Kernel 6.6.136 or later, then confirm no affected versions remain in your inventory.

How Secuno handles this

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