CVE-2026-72191
Linux kernel vulnerability
- Published15 Aug 2026
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs3: validate split-point offset in indx_insert_into_buffer indx_insert_into_buffer() computes used = used1 - to_copy - sp_size; memmove(de_t, Add2Ptr(sp, sp_size), used - le32_to_cpu(hdr1->de_off)); where sp and sp_size come from hdr_find_split(). hdr_find_split() walks entries by le16_to_cpu(e->size) without validating that each step stays within hdr->used or that the size field is at least sizeof(struct NTFS_DE). index_hdr_check(), the on-load gatekeeper, only validates header-level fields (used, total, de_off) and does not walk per-entry sizes. A crafted NTFS image whose leaf INDEX_HDR reports used == total but contains one interior NTFS_DE with size = 0xFFF0 therefore passes validation, descends to indx_insert_into_buffer() through the ntfs_create() -> indx_insert_entry() path, and makes hdr_find_split() return an sp whose sp_size (0xFFF0) greatly exceeds the remaining bytes in the buffer. The u32 subtraction underflows and the memmove count becomes a near-4-GiB value, producing an out-of-bounds kernel write that corrupts adjacent allocations and panics the kernel. Reproduced on 7.0.0-rc7 with UML + KASAN via a crafted image and a single 'touch' inside the mounted directory; crash site resolves to fs/ntfs3/index.c at the memmove. Trigger requires only local mount of an attacker-supplied filesystem image (USB, loopback, or removable media auto-mount). Reject the split whenever the chosen sp plus its declared size already extends past hdr1->used. This is the minimal fix; it preserves the existing hdr_find_split() contract and relies on the same out: cleanup path as the pre-existing error returns. A prior OOB read in the very same indx_insert_into_buffer() memmove was fixed in commit b8c44949044e ("fs/ntfs3: Fix OOB read in indx_insert_into_buffer") by tightening hdr_find_e(), but that fix does not cover the split-point size field path addressed here: sp is returned by hdr_find_split(), not hdr_find_e(), and the underflow is driven by sp->size rather than hdr->used exceeding hdr->total.
CVSS 3.1 breakdown
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HRemediation
No fixed version is recorded in the NVD data. Check the vendor advisory for the latest guidance.
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1758a564b6ebe7f4a82f23c9851d1cae15549457
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c2f648139a0a86f4486170f72e24fedd4fae74e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7bf74e6baf810fe325f111996496c678fc6e244f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e4ba5a38c155bb3c1c11e63cd285b178cdb099e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b232eb5c9fe11ec2368e9b565db69c724c35fbd2
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f1df9d771df47aa40de6d70949c28720ae1e430d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3624cc069195001c88df7a291af215f2133ff2c
Frequently asked
Is CVE-2026-72191 being actively exploited?
CVE-2026-72191 is not in the CISA KEV catalog. Its EPSS exploit probability is 0.70%.
How severe is CVE-2026-72191?
CVE-2026-72191 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.8, rated critical. EPSS estimates a 0.70% probability of exploitation.
How do I fix CVE-2026-72191?
Apply the vendor's patch or advisory guidance, then verify no affected versions remain across your devices.
How Secuno handles this
Secuno correlates vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-72191 against the real software inventory on every managed device, as each hourly inventory arrives. Rather than a static severity, each match is scored in context: exploit availability, EPSS, the asset's exposure, and business criticality decide where it lands in the queue. If an affected version is present anywhere across your portfolio, it surfaces automatically with a prioritised remediation path.
Data from the NVD, CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS. CVSS 3.1 base score shown where available.