CVE-2026-76835

Description

OAuth2 Proxy honours a client-supplied X-Forwarded-Uri header when deciding whether a request may skip authentication, because the guard added for CVE-2026-40575 is inert in the default reverse-proxy configuration. GetRequestURI in pkg/requests/util/util.go prefers that header over the real request URI whenever CanTrustForwardedHeaders returns true, and isAllowedPath in oauthproxy.go matches the skip_auth_routes and skip_auth_regex allow list against the resulting path. CanTrustForwardedHeaders in pkg/apis/middleware/scope.go grants that trust when the caller's address is in the trusted proxy set, and buildTrustedProxyNetSet falls back to defaultTrustedProxyIPs, which is 0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0, whenever reverse proxy mode is enabled without trusted_proxy_ip configured. Every client is therefore treated as a trusted proxy. An unauthenticated attacker can request a protected upstream path while setting X-Forwarded-Uri to a value matching an allow-listed route, so the skip-auth decision is made against the spoofed value while the upstream receives the protected path unchanged.

CVSS 3.1 breakdown

Remediation

No fixed version is recorded in the NVD data. Check the vendor advisory for the latest guidance.

References

• https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy
• https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/blob/v7.15.4/pkg/apis/middleware/scope.go
• https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/issues/3506
• https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/security/advisories/GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x
• https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/oauth2-proxy-through-authentication-bypass-via-x-forwarded-uri-under-the-default-trusted-proxy-set

Related CVEs

Recent high-severity vulnerabilities sharing a weakness type.

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